Typology of relationship power

typology of relationship power

While the relationship between power and violence defines the purpose for my typology, the distinction between the different types of power proceeds along two . From this exercise, we construct a stylized typology of power in GVCs. . still that the main power dynamic in business relationships would be coercive in. In this chapter we discuss diverse types of relationship between the participants in critical dialogue where power and authority are understood.

In this way revolution had been avoided. While Gramsci stresses the significance of ideology in power structures, Marxist-feminist writers such as Michele Barrett stress the role of ideologies in extolling the virtues of family life. The classic argument to illustrate this point of view is the use of women as a ' reserve army of labour '.

In wartime it is accepted that women perform masculine tasks, while after the war the roles are easily reversed. Therefore, according to Barrett, the destruction of capitalist economic relations is necessary but not sufficient for the liberation of women. He shows that power over an individual can be amplified by the presence of a group.

If the group conforms to the leader's commands, the leader's power over an individual is greatly enhanced while if the group does not conform the leader's power over an individual is nil. Foucault[ edit ] For Michel Foucaultthe real power will always rely on the ignorance of its agents.

No single human, group nor single actor runs the dispositif machine or apparatus but power is dispersed through the apparatus as efficiently and silently as possible, ensuring its agents to do whatever is necessary. It is because of this action that power is unlikely to be detected that it remains elusive to 'rational' investigation. This milieu both artificial and natural appears as a target of intervention for power according to Foucault which is radically different from the previous notions on sovereignty, territory and disciplinary space inter woven into from a social and political relations which function as a species biological species.

He writes, "A body is docile that may be subjected, used, transformed and improved. Instead of using corporeal punishment in order to convince people to adhere to the laws of the day, Foucault says power becomes internalized during this period. Instead of watching someone be drawn and quartered in a public space, political power is exerted on individuals in a way that compels them to obey laws and rules on their own - without this show of force.

He builds on the ideas of Jeremy Bentham regarding the Panopticon in which prison inmates are compelled to behave and control themselves because they might be in the view of the prison guard. The physical shape of the Panopticon creates a situation in which the prison guard need not be present for this to happen, because the mere possibility of the presence of the guard compels the prisoners to behave.

Foucault takes this theory and makes it generalize to everyday life. He claims that this kind of surveillance is constant in modern society, and the populous at large enacts it. Therefore, everyone begins to control themselves and behave according to society's rules and norms. Feminist philosophers took up Foucault's ideas regarding docile bodies and applied them to the different ways men and women are socialized to use their bodies.

She also cites diet, exercise, and skin care, among other processes, as sites in which the feminine body is made docile. Clegg[ edit ] Stewart Clegg proposes another three-dimensional model with his "circuits of power" [15] theory.

typology of relationship power

This model likens the production and organizing of power to an electric circuit board consisting of three distinct interacting circuits: These circuits operate at three levels, two are macro and one is micro. The episodic circuit is the micro level and is constituted of irregular exercise of power as agents address feelings, communication, conflict, and resistance in day-to-day interrelations.

The outcomes of the episodic circuit are both positive and negative. The dispositional circuit is constituted of macro level rules of practice and socially constructed meanings that inform member relations and legitimate authority. The facilitative circuit is constituted of macro level technology, environmental contingencies, job design, and networks, which empower or disempower and thus punish or reward, agency in the episodic circuit.

All three independent circuits interact at "obligatory passage points" which are channels for empowerment or disempowerment. Galbraith[ edit ] JK Galbraith summarizes the types of power as being "condign" based on force"compensatory" through the use of various resources or "conditioned" the result of persuasionand their sources as "personality" individuals"property" their material resources and "organizational" whoever sits at the top of an organisational power structure.

Thus a political regime maintains power because people accept and obey its dictates, laws and policies.

Sharp's key theme is that power is not monolithic; that is, it does not derive from some intrinsic quality of those who are in power. For Sharp, political power, the power of any state — regardless of its particular structural organization — ultimately derives from the subjects of the state. His fundamental belief is that any power structure relies upon the subjects' obedience to the orders of the ruler s.

If subjects do not obey, leaders have no power.

Power (social and political) - Wikipedia

Rejecting instructive power is possible — rejecting destructive power is not. By using this distinction, proportions of power can be analyzed in a more sophisticated way, helping to sufficiently reflect on matters of responsibility. This perspective permits to get over an "either-or-position" either there is power, or there isn'twhich is common especially in epistemological discourses about power theories, [24] [25] [26] and to introduce the possibility of an "as well as-position". The theory analyzes the culture of the powerful.

The powerful comprise those people in society with easy access to resources, those who can exercise power without considering their actions. The unmarked category can form the identifying mark of the powerful.

The unmarked category becomes the standard against which to measure everything else. For most Western readers, it is posited that if a protagonist's race is not indicated, it will be assumed by the reader that the protagonist is Caucasian ; if a sexual identity is not indicated, it will be assumed by the reader that the protagonist is heterosexual ; if the gender of a body is not indicated, will be assumed by the reader that it is male ; if a disability is not indicated, it will be assumed by the reader that the protagonist is able bodied, just as a set of examples.

One can often overlook unmarked categories.

How to improve your relationship - How to move from Power Struggle to Connection

Whiteness forms an unmarked category not commonly visible to the powerful, as they often fall within this category. The unmarked category becomes the norm, with the other categories relegated to deviant status.

Social groups can apply this view of power to race, genderand disability without modification: Dual power leftist theory The term 'counter-power' sometimes written 'counterpower' is used in a range of situations to describe the countervailing force that can be utilised by the oppressed to counterbalance or erode the power of elites. A general definition has been provided by the anthropologist David Graeber as 'a collection of social institutions set in opposition to the state and capital: Making Change Happen, [28] put forward a theory that those disempowered by governments' and elite groups' power can use counterpower to counter this.

The thought of Friedrich Nietzsche underlies much 20th century analysis of power. Nietzsche disseminated ideas on the " will to power ," which he saw as the domination of other humans as much as the exercise of control over one's environment. Some schools of psychologynotably that associated with Alfred Adlerplace power dynamics at the core of their theory where orthodox Freudians might place sexuality.

Psychological research[ edit ] Recent experimental psychology suggests that the more power one has, the less one takes on the perspective of others, implying that the powerful have less empathy. Adam Galinskyalong with several coauthors, found that when those who are reminded of their powerlessness are instructed to draw Es on their forehead, they are 3 times more likely to draw them such that they are legible to others than those who are reminded of their power.

In one example, powerful people turned off an irritatingly close fan twice as much as less powerful people. Researchers have documented the bystander effect: Empathy gap "Power is defined as a possibility to influence others. Having power or not having power can cause a number of psychological consequences. It leads to strategic versus social responsibilities. It was concluded[ by whom?

Being strategic can also mean to defend when one is opposed or to hurt the decision-maker. How do class differences influence social norms of cooperation? How do rules influence the formation of discourses? How do heterogeneous assemblages enable particular regulations? Environmental governance processes and outcomes are depicted in the center of the typology overlapping with all four quadrants, reminding us that, ultimately, we are interested in the implications of power-institution relationships for environmental governance and their social and ecological consequences.

In the following four subsections, we provide brief examples of existing research and potential research questions that can be situated in the typology. We do this to indicate the type of work that can populate the typology as well as to highlight the utility of the typology for understanding and identifying gaps in existing research as part of a broader research agenda on power and institutions.

Scholarship in quadrant I investigates the ways that institutions influence power structures. It includes studies both of how institutions can reinforce existing structures and how institutions can reconfigure or mitigate the effects of prevailing power structures in environmental governance. One example of research in this quadrant relates to coinciding interests among institutionalists and political ecologists regarding strategies to mitigate the power of capitalist market structures, to which environmentally degradative effects have often been attributed.

Scholarship on local self-governance of the commons has already engaged with such questions. For instance, local institutions for monitoring and enforcing rules to control resource harvesting may moderate the influence of market pressures that emanate from powerful external economic interests Agrawal and Yadama ; Chhatre and Agrawal Others document how collective property rights accompanied by local institutions that redistribute profits among groups of resource users can create incentives and capacity for collective action toward sustainable resource governance as well as promote independence from powerful actors in supply chains that otherwise tend to consolidate profits and power Alcorn and Toledo ; Bennett and Basurto ; Tschopp et al.

Research questions positioned within the first quadrant of the typology can also address how institutions shape the effects of other power structures such as gender, class, and inequality. Within much of the commons scholarship, the presence of these power structures is addressed under the broad concept of socio-cultural heterogeneity. A substantial body of work from the Bloomington School already addresses questions about how institutions may enable collective action even in the presence of substantial socio-cultural power imbalances.

For example, institutions that prescribe procedural or distributional equity may support collective action in the context of socio-cultural heterogeneity and corresponding power imbalances Poteete ; Poteete and Ostrom ; Mudliar and Koontz However, additional questions are possible.

For example, can micro-credit institutions targeting women alter gender-based power dynamics and reduce dependence on local resources? Do rules that require individuals to contribute to environmental governance efforts in proportion to their level of wealth serve to promote greater equality and sustainability? Or, can effective multi-level institutional linkages increase the participation of disenfranchised classes in the development of environmental policies? Questions conceivable in the first quadrant thus not only help to understand the institutional antecedents of entrenched power structures but may also uncover creative strategies for overcoming predominating power structures linked to unsustainable or inequitable patterns of environmental governance Andersson and Agrawal Quadrant II inverts the questions posed above by asking how power structures influence institutions.

Much of the inquiry in this quadrant helps to explain how power structures such as class, capitalist markets, or gender might shape the laws, rules, and regulations of society. For example, one might ask how capitalist markets create incentives for corporations to pursue less stringent regulatory institutions, while others might try to explain the disproportionate influence of one gender over others in the design and implementation of institutions.

A particularly important topic of debate in institutionalist scholarship rooted in rational choice theory and methodological individualism relates to the impact of structures of wealth inequality on processes of institutional emergence and change.

Some have argued that, when the interests of actors in creating or changing institutions are not aligned, wealthier actors can leverage their power to influence decision-making and see their preferred institutions enacted. Assuming that individuals and groups incur costs when bargaining over policies, those with greater wealth can direct more resources towards bargaining processes, withstand higher risks of failed negotiations, and hold out for longer before needing to reach an agreement Knight While unequal wealth structures can reduce cooperation in commons governance Cardenasthis outcome is not inevitable.

For instance, wealthy parties may make significant contributions to public goods — including the design of self-governance institutions themselves — that leave all resource users better off Olson ; Ostrom ; Baland and Platteau Similar research questions may also be asked about other power structures. Do class, caste or gender enable or limit participation in institutional development and change processes?

How might these structures influence not only opportunities for actors to shape institutions, but also the kinds of institutions they promote? Quadrant III addresses questions about how institutions influence power constructs derived from post-structural theory. This can include questions regarding how rules, regulations, norms, and laws shape discourses, networks, or identities. For example, institutions can influence how subjectivities emerge and change. The concept of environmentality exemplifies this process.

They came to favor limiting extraction of forest resources, seeing themselves as agents of forest conservation Agrawal Another line of inquiry can interrogate the institutions that shape how discourses and knowledge form and take hold. Specific rules and norms shape who has the authority to assert their knowledge as true and how it is circulated Foucault ; Mayr For example, institutions lay out requirements for who is allowed to carry out legitimate scientific research e.

Other institutions can specify how information and knowledge travels e. These types of institutions can certainly influence discourses.

typology of relationship power

In the context of environmental governance, important questions emerge about what kinds of institutions enable or block diverse perspectives from informing pervasive discourse, which in turn can shape environmental governance. Finally, questions in this quadrant may explore how institutions create networks and entanglements of heterogeneous elements.

For example, sustainable seafood and forest certification, which are transnational market-based governance institutions, bring together multiple human and non-human actors into a relatively durable network.

Such networks include consumers, retailers, and NGOs that demand sustainably produced fish or forest products, producers who harvest resources and the State authorities that govern them, trees and forests or fish and ocean spaces, and scientists and third-party evaluators who assess the entire system according to a set of sustainability standards.

These networks are held together, in large part, by the institutions that prescribe how certification schemes establish standards, assess sustainability, ensure compliance, and transmit information to consumers.

Such questions are crucial to the study of commons whose social and ecological dimensions span beyond state jurisdictions and thus often require self-governing institutions that operate across substantial distances. The questions in this quadrant illuminate a space for novel inquiry. While it is often implicit that rules and norms play a role in shaping power constructs such as discourse, identity, or networks, an explicit institutional analysis of how these constructs emerge and change is yet to be undertaken.

To the extent that post-structuralist political ecologists and scholars of the environment see power as contingent, empirically variegated, and subject to reformation, it is worthwhile to ask how society might design institutions that allow reflective and purposive formation of power constructs and thereby contribute to equitable and sustainable environmental governance.

Finally, quadrant IV houses questions concerning how power constructs shape institutions. In other words, how do discourses, networks, categories or ideas influence the emergence, form and function of institutions? Research in this quadrant often illuminates how these power constructs inform what society imagines is possible and desireable. This, in turn, shapes the kinds of environmental governance institutions that emerge and persist.

The study of how scalar discourses shape environmental governance constitutes an example of ongoing research that fits squarely in this quadrant. In the early s, discourses promoting local-level governance of common-pool resources played a role in the promotion of community-based management and a justification for decentralization in natural resource governance. In some cases, the naively optimistic and contextually underspecified nature of these discourses enabled inappropriate or ineffective institutions Agrawal and Gibson ; Lawhon and Patel More recently, discourses emphasizing the importance of large-scale ecological processes for biological conservation have promoted the formation of national- and regional-scale governance Moss; Gruby and Basurto ; Sievanen et al.

These studies demonstrate how studying power constructs such as discourses helps advance research on the autonomy of resource users in common-pool resource governance, which has been a central question in commons scholarship Ostrom ; Basurto Other power constructs can be just as potent as discourse in shaping governance institutions.

For example, entanglements or networks of heterogeneous elements e. Along these lines, Forsberg examined how a non-human actor notched sticks created information networks among groups of commoners and produced the conditions for self-governance of a variety of commons Forsberg In other cases, studying the role of non-human elements e.

Discussion This paper contributes to a rapidly developing program of research seeking to understand the role of power in commons governance and institutions Clement; Theesfeld ; Epstein et al. Specifically, we developed a typology to classify relationships between power and institutions.

The organization of the typology is based upon distinguishing between two primary theoretical approaches to power the horizontal division and whether power or institutions are positioned as the agents of influence the vertical division.

We then used this typology to highlight existing research that fits within each quadrant and opportunities for future research. Bringing together the unique focal strengths of political ecology and Bloomington School institutionalism especially that which relates to environmental governance illuminates novel research questions about how power specifically, power with a strong theoretical and conceptual basis in political economy or post-structuralism and institutions as conceptualized by the Bloomington School interact.

Rather than integrate the fields to address existing questions differently, our goal was to draw out the specific questions rooted squarely at the intersection of the two approaches. These questions, in turn, should generate insights into environmental governance more broadly, a shared interest of the fields. Other important questions, such as how power shapes human-environment relations in spite of institutions Agrawal fall outside the boundaries of our discussion.

This bounding of scope also acknowledges that many questions can be sufficiently addressed by political ecology or institutional analysis without the need for integration. Beyond guiding the formulation of empirical questions, the typology also brings epistemological and methodological challenges to the forefront, issues which any effort to bring critical and institutional approaches into conversation must address.

Perhaps the most preeminent of these challenges arises from the theoretical roots of Bloomington School institutionalism in rational choice theory.

Power (social and political)

Rational choice theory assumes that individuals make choices to maximize their own net benefits based on information about the structure of the situations they are involved in and the behavior of other actors. One potential concern, then, is that any theory of human behavior rooted in such a calculative perspective is incompatible with post-structural approaches skeptical of the existence of a universal set of preferences, costs, and benefits on which decisions might be based.

Yet, even though the Bloomington School is linked to rational choice theory, it has nonetheless put emphasis on illuminating its failures to explain a wide range of observed empirical phenomena, e. Research at the intersection of post-structural power and institutions may therefore provide opportunities to develop even richer understandings of why people behave the way they do and how they self-organize to overcome governance challenges.

Relatedly, an apparent tension arises from bringing together post-structuralist theories that lean toward constructionism with the typically more positivist approaches associated with Bloomington School institutionalism. However, the idea that society and the environment are socially produced does not fundamentally contradict the premise that institutions are human-created linguistic constructs that influence interactions between people in society and their biophysical surroundings.

Existing research examining the influence of social constructions on environmental and natural resource governance demonstrates the potential for coherency Agrawal ; Gruby et al. As Clement points out, a critical realist approach offers a useful ontological middle ground for integrating post-structural and institutional concepts see also Forsyth While epistemological tensions are certainly worth taking into account, they do not pose insurmountable barriers to addressing the question of power and institutions in the context of studying environmental governance.

While the positivist leanings of Bloomington School institutionalism may be more commensurate with conceptualizations of power rooted in political economy, its focus on methodological individualism poses a different problem. The Bloomington School often explains social outcomes as a result of individual behavior and decision-making Arrow ; Hodgson In contrast, Marxist-inspired political economy frequently looks to broader political, economic, and ideological forces for explanation.

It is thus not surprising that institutionalist definitions of power emphasize micro-dynamics regarding the authority and control that particular actors have over specific situations e. Ostrom while Marxist political economy often employs conceptualizations of power referent to external processes and broader structures.

Drawing explicit connections between power-centric and institutional approaches therefore fosters opportunities to gain additional insight by investigating both macro- and micro-level processes, and their respective linkages Knight Institutional scholars have, for instance, investigated how inequality in material resources and bargaining power shapes the ability of individuals to enact their preferred institutions. Connecting this perspective with theoretical approaches from political economy involves situating inequality and bargaining power as part of broader power structures in society, for example how capitalist systems of accumulation entrench an unequal distribution of resources.

An integrated approach can therefore enrich our understanding of how these broader power structures affect the often-minute processes of environmental governance on the ground.

Thus, engaging with theories of power used in political ecology does not imply an abandonment of micro-institutional power dynamics. To the contrary, it compels institutionalists to examine the structural origins of the micro-institutional dynamics of power as well as the potential for institutions to alter the broader power structures within which they operate. Integrating political ecological and institutional approaches also provides a platform from which to illuminate similar concepts rooted in divergent epistemologies.

Similarly, while scholars engaging ideas such as networks and entanglements comprised of social and natural elements have developed radical ontological platforms to account for non-human agency and its implications Callon ; Latourcommon-pool resource theory has also concerned itself with how biophysical characteristics shape the realm of possibility of environmental governance institutions Schlager et al.

Forsbergfor example, seamlessly integrates post-structuralist Actor-Network Theory with theories of collective action based on modified rational choice theory to show how non-human actors shape institutions for collective action. Additionally, institutionalists studying multi-level and cross-scale linkages in the governance of common-pool resources e.

By providing a common space to position research on broad overarching questions, the typology aids in identifying instances when scholars are researching similar concepts yet talking about them in different ways.

Finally, one of the most substantial challenges inherent in studying the ways that power and institutions shape each other entails grappling with the complexity and dynamism that characterizes those relationships.

That institutions and power are in fact inextricably interwoven compounds this challenge. For example, institutions constitute an important facet of discourses Burchell et al. Thus, understanding how power shapes institutions and vice versa calls for a mutual externalization of the two concepts, albeit temporarily and artificially.

This is not an essentially distinct process from most research, which by necessity captures a select moment or moments in time and brings into focus certain elements while setting others aside.

The typology, along with Figure 1facilitates this by supporting an explicit identification of which elements of power and which institutions a given study investigates. Conclusion The typology facilitates the integration of two fields that, despite shared interests, have developed largely independently from one another. Political ecology and institutional analysis have both generated valuable insights regarding the role of resource users themselves in governance as well as the potentially negative consequences of management through markets and top-down state control Berkes ; Acheson ; Ostrom ; McKean ; Fairhead and Leach ; Bryant ; Young ; Peet and Watts Despite their corresponding interests, the relationship between the two disciplines has often been characterized as one of distinction rather than convergence Johnson Institutional approaches seek to develop an understanding of the kinds of governance arrangements that lead to ecologically and socially desirable outcomes Ostrom ; Cox et al.

Conversely, political ecology emphasizes power, yet its varied ontological and epistemological framings can prove overwhelming for policy-makers trying to apply its findings Walker ; Blaikie This division has meant that questions about the interactions between power and institutions have not been thoroughly addressed.

The typology and associated theoretical work presented in this paper serve as a step toward articulating and answering these important questions. Acknowledgments The authors are grateful to three anonymous reviewers and the editors of the International Journal of the Commons for their valuable comments and suggestions, as well as Xavier Basurto for his review of an early version of the manuscript.

The manuscript also benefited from comments and discussion by participants in an International Association for the Study of the Commons IASC conference panel on power and institutional analysis.

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