Spoken Reasons - IMDb
Spoken Reasons was born on December 19, in Bradenton, Florida, USA as Producer (1 credit). Relationship Games: Part 2 (TV Series) (producer). And when I say “dated,” I do mean that these relationships went well beyond the stereotypical one-night-stand “boytoy” liaison. My first shit I shouldn't have to explain, and I think part of this was due to the age/experience difference. I know way more about video games than I'd ever want to know. @SpokenReasons relationship games PT 3 drops June 2nd! after my next football game! Will be a great weekend! 6 years ago · Twitter for iPhone · en. 3 1.
And the interesting games would be such as brought one via certain rules to nonsensical instructions. Could it be in pain?
UnSpoken Truth: (Ep #65) SPOKEN WORD PROJECT Unspoken Truth Radio podcast
It surely comes as close as possible as being such a machine. In Philosophical Grammar Wittgenstein maintains the following: Certainly it is senseless to talk about a prosthetic substitute for seeing and hearing. We do talk of artificial feet, but not of artificial pains in the foot. One, following Wittgenstein, may argue the twofold contention. In a sense this is obviously false — it is not a game, in the ordinary sense.
In a sense it is obviously true — there is some similarity. Wittgenstein, in his Philosophical Investigations contends the following on machines and humans: Consider the following case. Human beings or creatures of some other kind are used by us as reading-machines.
They are trained for this purpose. The trainer says of some that they can already read, of others that they cannot yet do so. Take the case of a pupil who lias so far not taken part in the training: A third person hears this pupil on such an occasion and says: But the teacher says: After a while the teacher says: Is the teacher to say: Which was the first word that he read?
This question makes no sense here. Unless, indeed, we give a definition: Pie can then say, e. This concept was therefore quite independent of that of a mental or other mechanism.
For there is no doubt about what he did.
To that Wittgenstein argues in Logical Investigation that the sheer act of playing a game does not necessarily define its meaning or rules but only constitutes its possible interoperation. Whatever I do is, on some interpretation, in accord with the rule. Interpretations by themselves do not determine meaning. What sort of connexion is there here?
I have been trained to react to this sign in a particular way, and now I do so react to it.
But that is only to give a causal connexion; to tell how it has come about that we now go by the sign-post; not what this going-by-the-sign really consists in. On the contrary; I have further indicated that a person goes by a sign-post only in so far as there exists a regular use of sign-posts, a custom. This was our paradox: And so there would be neither accord nor conflict here.
It can be seen that there is a misunderstanding here from the mere fact that in the course of our argument we give one interpretation after another; as if each one contented us at least for a moment, until we thought of yet another standing behind it. Hence there is an inclination to say: Even if someone had a particular capacity only when, and only as long as, he had a particular feeling, the feeling would not be the capacity.
References Adorno, W Theodor. Aesthetic Theory Copland, B. Fact, Fiction and Forecast Goodman, Nelson. On Computable Numbers, with an application to the Entscheidungsproblem, Proc. Computing machinery and intelligence. Can digital computers think?
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He may have chosen the book rather than the hand because it is perhaps slightly more obvious that there are special circumstances in which we could be wrong.
I have the proper grounds for my statement. So if the other person is acquainted with the language game, he would admit that I know. The other, if he is acquainted with the language-game, must be able to imagine how, one may know something of the kind. Your knowing, in the language game, counts as knowing when others can see how you could have reached it.
The sceptic or idealist does not doubt this — what they might term mere subjective common-sense certainty — but asserts that these grounds for knowledge are actually not sufficient grounds at all, because what appears to be a hand may just as well be an illusion. Otherwise it would be possible to point out the discovery of the planet Saturn to the doubters and say that its existence has been proved, and hence the existence of the external world as well.
And if that is so, then there can be an inference to the truth of an assertion. And anyone who is acquainted with the language game must realize this—an assurance from a reliable man that he knows cannot contribute anything.
We should be ready to show how we know it. And if he says he knows it, that can only signify to me that he has been able to make sure, and hence that his arms are e. My believing the trustworthy man stems from my admitting that it is possible for him to make sure. But someone who says that perhaps there are no physical objects makes no such admission. When the man says he knows he has hands, he can say it, and I accept it, in the context of a situation in which he could have found this out.
We both presuppose this as a background. And believing is the result of the combination of his trustworthiness and my acceptance that he could have made sure of what he claims. The sceptic here would not be properly partaking of a language-game, though he thinks it legitimate to express these doubts.
But we can of course express a local scepticism, if the man is wearing bandages and possibly does not know whether or not his hands have been amputated. This is where it makes sense for him to say he knows he has two hands.
I know that they exist. Hence, that we should first have to ask: Only in particular circumstances is it impossible. What use is a rule to us here? Such a circumstance corresponds to a language-game, and the idealist who says he has the right to doubt the existence of his hands — saying what he is saying as an idealist, and not someone lying in hospital with bandaged hands waking up from an operation — is not taking part in such a language-game.
The question might then arise, how do we know which language-games we can legitimately doubt in? Might the idealist not say that for all we know, this whatever it is is a situation in which I can legitimately doubt. This is what prompts Wittgenstein to pretend to wonder if there is some rule that we can follow to make sure we never misuse words in the way that philosophers sometimes do. But there is no end to the possibility of error. We must accept these certainties, which cannot be guaranteed either with proofs or with rules.
And we recognize normal circumstances but cannot precisely describe them. At most, we can describe a range of abnormal ones. But such circumstances are not so defined as to allow us to set down a rule. And what is pointed to here is something indeterminate. We can be assured of being right, or of being able to doubt, and so on, through our engagement in language-games, our partaking of situations.
That is where the rules apply and that is how we learn them—but they cannot be pinned down or set in stone. Practice in the use of the rule also shews what is a mistake in its employment. But it seems plain to me that to identify mistakes it is not enough just to be practiced in language-games. This is exactly the situation that requires dissection at the hands of Wittgenstein and Ryle, Austin and so on. He probably means that our use of words should alert us to mistakes, or that it has the potential to, if only we just pay more attention.
There are two solutions here: When someone has made sure of something, he says: Certainty is as it were a tone of voice in which one declares how things are, but one does not infer from the tone of voice that one is justified.
I think this is vitally important.
Reasons Why Single Women in Their 40s Should Try the “Cougar” Thing. At Least Briefly.
There is no inference, hence there is no way to argue that I am not really certain. This suggests that when, locked away in his room, Descartes found that he could doubt the existence of his body, this was a mistake: He claimed to doubt things that he was actually unshakeably certain of.
Descartes was imagining, rather than properly doubting. We might fruitfully speculate about how Descartes got himself in this pickle.
When I was in my 20s, I was truthfully a neurotic mess when it came to sex. Ironically, despite my body being less sleek, trim and smooth than those days, I have WAY more confidence. Back then I was an idiot who insisted on sex with the lights out. You find it fun to teach someone younger than you about how it was back in the day. One day, my first much younger boyfriend texted me: Have you ever seen the movie Say Anything?
That movie was life when I was in high school. He was born the year I graduated high school. Lots of people born in the 80s romanticize the era. They have no idea what it was really like to have a doddering old fogey president who joked about bombing the Soviet Union and diddled while people died of AIDS. Or how to make a budget. Or how not to get arrested for drinking too much. Many of them have no clue about universal relationship boundaries.
I realized later he was keeping her as a back-up. We had many arguments about this girl, as she seemed to be completely obsessed with him.