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Relationship counseling can be done one-on-one basis or in group. Relationship counseling can help eliminating the problems in your relationships. For More Details Vi.. Indo-China Relationship. By: az-links.infoi. Yet for Hong, one of almost 8, Indochinese refugees expected to resettle without reliable emotional counseling, new Indochinese refugees may suicide, alcoholism, the destruction of vital family relationships and child. At least , Indochinese refugees teered to direct disturbed refugees to an came to and the complexity of the problems they tional ties, relationships with.
Changes in situations like financial state, physical health, and the influence of other family members can have a profound influence on the conduct, responses and actions of the individuals in a relationship. Often it is an interaction between two or more factors, and frequently it is not just one of the people who are involved that exhibit such traits.
Relationship influences are reciprocal: A viable solution to the problem and setting these relationships back on track may be to reorient the individuals' perceptions and emotions - how one looks at or responds to situations and feels about them. Perceptions of and emotional responses to a relationship are contained within an often unexamined mental map of the relationship, also called a love map by John Gottman.
These can be explored collaboratively and discussed openly. The core values they comprise can then be understood and respected or changed when no longer appropriate. This implies that each person takes equal responsibility for awareness of the problem as it arises, awareness of their own contribution to the problem and making some fundamental changes in thought and feeling. The next step is to adopt conscious, structural changes to the inter-personal relationships and evaluate the effectiveness of those changes over time.
Indeed, "typically for those close personal relations there is a certain degree in 'interdependence' - which means that the partners are alternately mutually dependent on each other. As a special aspect of such relations something contradictory is put outside: But it depends on the specific developing duties of each partner in every life phase and maturity".
Each helps couples learn a method of communicating designed to create a safe environment for each partner to express and hear feelings. When the Munich Marital Study discovered active listening to not be used in the long run,  Warren Farrell observed that active listening did a better job creating a safe environment for the criticizer to criticize than for the listener to hear the criticism.
The listener, often feeling overwhelmed by the criticism, tended to avoid future encounters.
He hypothesized that we were biologically programmed to respond defensively to criticism, and therefore the listener needed to be trained in-depth with mental exercises and methods to interpret as love what might otherwise feel abusive. His method is Cinematic Immersion. After 30 years of research into marriage John Gottman has found that healthy couples almost never listen and echo each other's feelings naturally.
What's more, Gottman noted, data from a Munich study demonstrated that the reflective listening exercise itself didn't help couples to improve their marriages. To teach such interactions, whether as a daily tool for couples or as a therapeutic exercise in empathy, was a clinical dead end.
Emotions bring the past alive in rigid interaction patterns, which create and reflect absorbing emotional states. As one of its founders Sue Johnson says, Forget about learning how to argue better, analysing your early childhood, making grand romantic gestures, or experimenting with new sexual positions. Instead, recognize and admit that you are emotionally attached to and dependent on your partner in much the same way that a child is on a parent for nurturing, soothing, and protection.
The basic principles for a counselor include: Any leverage from these sources was severely limited by the broader considerations of U. To threaten France with economic and military sanctions in Europe in order to have it alter its policy in Indochina was, therefore, not plausible. Similarly, to reduce the level of military assistance to the French effort in Indochina would have been counter-productive, since it would have led to a further deterioration in the French military position there.
In other words, there was a basic incompatibility in the two strands of U. For France, which was probably fighting more a colonial than an anti-communist war, and which had to consider the effects of withdrawal on colonial holdings in Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco, magnanimous withdrawal was not too likely. France, having no such policy incompatibilities, could and did pursue a consistent course with the stronger bargaining hand.
Thus, the French were able to resist pressures from Washington and through the MAAG in Saigon to create a truly Vietnamese army, to grant the Vietnamese more local autonomy and to wage the war more effectively.Chatting with a Marriage Counselor
MAAG was relegated to a supply function and its occasional admonitions to the French were interpreted by them as interference in their internal affairs. Even though bythe U. The expectation of French victory over the Viet Minh encouraged the U.
France, therefore, had considerable leverage and, unless the U. The Viet Minh was, therefore, seen as part of the Southeast Asia manifestation of the world-wide communist expansionary movement.
French resistance to Ho Chi Minh, in turn, was thought to be a crucial link in the containment of communism. This strategic perception of the communist threat was supported by the espousal of the domino principle: The domino principle, which probably had its origin at the time of the Nationalist withdrawal from mainland China, was at the root of U.
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Although elements of a domino-like theory could be found in NSC papers before the start of the Korean War, the Chinese intervention in Korea was thought to be an ominous confirmation of its validity. The possibility of a large-scale Chinese intervention in Indochina, similar to that in Korea, was feared, especially after the armistice in Korea. The Eisenhower Administration followed the basic policy of its predecessor, but also deepened the American commitment to containment in Asia.
Secretary Dulles pursued a forthright, anti-communist policy and made it clear that he would not permit the "loss" of Indochina, in the manner the Democrats had allegedly allowed the "loss" of China. Dulles warned China not to intervene, and urged the French to drive toward a military victory.
Dulles was opposed to a cease-fire and tried to dissuade the French from negotiations with the Viet Minh until they had markedly improved their bargaining position through action on the battlefield. The NSC in early was persuaded that a non-communist coalition regime would eventually turn the country over to the Viet Minh. In consequence of this more militant policy, the U. Government tended to focus on the military rather than the political aspects of the French-Viet Minh struggle.
Among the more frequently cited misapprehensions concerning U. The record shows plainly that the U. With the intensification of the French-Viet Minh war and the deterioration of the French military position, the United States was forced to take a position on: In order to avoid a French sell-out, and as an alternative to unilateral U. Government internal debate on the question of intervention centered essentially on the desirability and feasibility of U.
Indochina's importance to U. The Eisenhower Administration followed in general terms the rationale for American interest in Indochina that was expressed by the Truman Administration. In late earlyas the fall of Indochina seemed imminent, the question of intervention came to the fore. The Defense Department pressed for a determination by highest authority of the size and nature of the forces the U. Some in DOD questioned the then operating assumption that U.
The Army was particularly concerned about contingency planning that assumed that U. The State Department thought that Indochina was so critical from a foreign policy viewpoint that intervention might be necessary.
Many in the U. Government the Ridgway Report stands out in this group were wary that U. In the latter case, even a considerable U. A number of special high-level studies were unable to bridge the evident disparity between those who held that vital U.
Consequently, when the French began pressing for U. Negotiations for a political settlement of the Franco-Viet Minh war, however, were assured when the Big Four Foreign Ministers meeting in February at Berlin placed Indochina on the agenda of the impending Geneva Conference. Foreign Minister Bidault insisted upon this, over U. The "peace faction" in Paris became stronger in proportion to the "peace feelers" let out by Ho Chi Minh, and the lack of French success on the battlefield.
Dulles and Admiral Radford were, at first, inclined towards an early unilateral intervention at Dien Bien Phu, as requested by the French the so-called "Operation Vulture". But Congressional leaders indicated they would not support U.
In addition to allied participation, Congressional approval was deemed dependent upon a public declaration by France that it was speeding up the timetable for independence for the Associated States.
The British response was one of hesitation in general, and flat opposition to undertaking military action before the Geneva Conference. Eden feared that it would lead to an expansion of the war with a high risk of Chinese intervention. Moreover, the British questioned both the U.
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As for the French, they were less interested in "united action" than in immediate U. Paris feared that united action would lead to the internationalization of the war, and take control out of its hands. In addition, it would impede or delay the very negotiations leading towards a settlement which the French increasingly desired.
But repeated French requests for direct U. Following the fall of Dien Bien Phu during the Geneva Conference, the "domino theory" underwent a reappraisal. End of Summary I. The French Predicament French perceptions of the conflict which broke out in December,between their forces in Indochina and the Viet Minh forces of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam DRV began to alternate between boundless optimism and unbridled gloom.
In the meantime, the French launched political forays similarly ambitious and equally unproductive. Our objective is clear: Within a month, an emissary journeyed into the jungle to deliver to Ho Chi Minh's government demands tantamount to unconditional surrender. About the same time, French representatives approached Bao Dai, the former Emperor of Annam, with proposals that he undertake to form a Vietnamese government as an alternate to Ho Chi Minh's.
Being unable to force a military resolution, and having foreclosed meaningful negotiations with Ho, the French turned to Bao Dai as their sole prospect for extrication from the growing dilemma in Vietnam. Bao Dai had become Emperor at the age of 12, inbut did not actually ascend the throne untilafter education in France. Inhe left Vietnam, and went to Hong Kong. There, he found himself solicited not only by French representatives, but by the DRV, who sought him to act on their behalf with the French.
Bao Dai attempted at first to maintain a central position between the two protagonists, but was soon persuaded to decline the Viet Minh overtures by non-Communist nationalists. One authority termed the National Union "a fragile coalition of discredited collaborators, ambitious masters of intrigue, incompetent sectarians, and a smattering of honest leaders without a following. Now, having eliminated the Viet Minh support option, Bao Dai became more compliant in his discussions with the French, and the French became correspondingly stiffer in their attitude toward the Viet Minh.
Yet, little came of the talks.
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On December 7,aboard a French warship in Ha Long Bay, Bao Dai signed an accord with the French, committing the French to Vietnamese political independence so minimally that it was promptly condemned not only by Diem, but also by more opportunistic colleagues in the National Union. Bao Dai, in what might have been a political withdrawal, removed himself from the developing intrigue, and fled to European pleasure centers for a four month jaunt which earned him the sobriquet "night club emperor.
French persistence eventually persuaded Bao Dai to return to Hong Kong, to endorse the formation of a Vietnamese national government prior to independence, and finally, to return to Vietnam as the Head of State. French negotiating pressures on him and the National Union included both spurious "leaks" of Franco-Viet Minh settlement talks, and further assurances of intentions to grant Vietnamese autonomy.
Thereby, France publicly and "solemnly" recognized the independence of Vietnam-but specifically retained control over foreign relations and the Army, and deferred transfer of other governmental functions to future negotiations; no authority was in fact transferred to the Vietnamese.
Again Bao Dai retired to Europe, while in Hanoi the French assembled a transparently impotent semblance of native government. A second summer of war passed in without dispelling the military miasma over Indochina, and without making the "Bao Dai solution" any less repugnant among Vietnamese patriots. Opposition to it began to mount among French Leftists. This disenchantment, combined with a spreading acceptance of the strategic view that the Franco-Viet Minh war was a key anti-Communist struggle, influenced French leaders to liberalize their approach to the "Bao Dai solution.
Elysee Agreement, On March 8,after months of negotiations, French President Auriol, in an exchange of letters with Bao Dai, reconfirmed independence for Vietnam as an Associated State of the French Union and detailed procedures for unifying Vietnam and placing it under Vietnamese administration.
Nonetheless, in the Elysee Agreement, France yielded control of neither Vietnam's army nor its foreign relations, and again postponed arrangements for virtually all other aspects of autonomy.
However, Bao Dai, apparently convinced that France was now sufficiently desperate in Indochina that it would have to honor the Agreements, declared that: An era of reconstruction and renovation will open in Vietnam.
The country will be given democratic institutions that will be called on primarily to approve the present agreement. Profound economic and social reforms will be instituted to raise the general standard of living and to promote social justice, which is the condition and guarantee of order. In late June,Vietnam was legally united under Bao Dai, but the related alteration of administrative functions was slow, and usually only pro forma; no genuine power or authority was turned over to the Vietnamese.
The State of Vietnam became a camouflage for continued French rule in Indochina. As Bao Dai himself characterized the situation in"What they call a Bao Dai solution turned out to be just a French solution. The situation in Indochina is getting worse every day Bao Dai's Governments The unsavory elements of the coalition supporting Bao Dai dominated his regime. Ngo Dinh Diem and a few other upright nationalists refused high government posts, and withdrew their support from Bao Dai when their expectations of autonomy were disappointed.
Diem's public statement criticized the probity of those who did accept office: The national aspirations of the Vietnamese people will be satisfied only on the day when our nation obtains the same political regime which India and Pakistan enjoy.
I believe it is only just to reserve the best posts in the new Vietnam for those who have deserved best of the country; I speak of those who resist.