After America leaves: Israel’s “new” Periphery Doctrine - Blogs - Jerusalem Post
The mystique of the “special relationship” is hard to shake: it is intimately bound up with self-image and self-interest. .. Some are born special (Israel). tactical doctrine, operational analysis, officer training, scientific and technical . only the UK and the USA but also Australia, New Zealand and Canada, under the close. The United States should cut all ties with war criminal Israel If you want to understand what the “special relationship” between Israel and the United States mundanes are expected to embrace the “escalation of force” doctrine under penalty of law. multimedia | Canada | Canada-Israel FTA Military and trade links . This idea that Canada and Israel are “best friends” and that the relationship .. emotionally involved in a very special way” as a Christian who grew up learning about the creation and support for the “Responsibility to Protect” doctrine.
Later in that same decade, Prime Minister Ehud Barak met with President Bill Clinton to gain American support for his highly ambitious plan mentioned above to achieve peace with both the Palestinians and the Syrians, and then spent the following year in extraordinarily close contact with Clinton and other top American officials.
The White House knew the details of the disengagement plan long before it was divulged to senior Israeli officials—including the defense minister. Later, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert similarly sought coordination with the United States at the Annapolis conference and with regard to his own far-reaching peace proposal to Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas in This takes us to one of the worst crises in U.
Since the aircraft itself had no American technology or components, no formal legal barrier existed to the deal. Nevertheless, the United States demanded that Israel cancel it out of concern that the aircraft might contribute to Chinese capabilities in some future conflict. Probably on no other issue involving Israel has an administration joined hands with Congress to exert such heavy, even brutal, pressure.
Some in Congress threatened a partial cutoff of military assistance; the Pentagon postponed action on Israeli requests for new weapons; the Air Force canceled a joint exercise with its Israeli counterpart. High-level talks on a strategic upgrade of the bilateral relationship were suspended, and the administration even threatened access to advanced defense technologies.
The Sino-Israeli military relationship has yet to recover.
Special-Relationship Doctrine Law and Legal Definition | USLegal, Inc.
Five years later, the same issue erupted anew, this time over follow-on support for an earlier sale to China of Israeli unmanned aerial vehicles UAVs.
Again the United States imposed sanctions on arms sales, joint projects, and exchanges of information and technology. Israel was barred from participating in the planning of the new F fighter, and was subjected to a U. Washington also insisted that the Knesset pass a new law regulating arms exports and that the cabinet set up an inter-ministerial coordinating committee to supervise exports of, in particular, items that could be used for either civilian or military purposes or both.
Finally, the director-general of the ministry of defense, whom the United States held personally responsible for having misled it, was forced to resign. Since then, despite ostensibly trying to bring the program under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, Washington has never done its utmost to stop it and certainly never exerted the kind of effort it has made to prevent other countries from pursuing nuclear capabilities.
The main point is this: The one significant exception, and the one almost always cited, is the bombing of the Iraqi nuclear reactor at Osirak in Of course, the very public way in which Netanyahu chose to oppose the deal, in a speech to the U. Congress, was an aberration; other Israeli leaders, no less strongly opposed, stopped well short of advocating open defiance of the United States. But it would have been even more openly defiant had Israel resorted to force—in, ironically enough, what would have been an inarguably legitimate exercise of its national prerogatives.Jeff Blankfort on Israel and the Special Relationship Part 2
Apart from the nuclear arena, the most contentious set of issues these days, generating the loudest complaints of Israeli defiance, centers on the peace process, especially when it comes to the status of Jerusalem, the settlements, and the Golan Heights. As for Jerusalem and the settlements, they are of supreme ideological importance. A large majority of the Israeli electorate considers Jerusalem to be the very heart of Judaism and of Israeli statehood, and a substantial, highly motivated, and well-organized minority opposes any concessions on the settlements.
In matters of such critical importance to its future, it is wholly appropriate for Israel to set its own course. Netanyahu, more embattled with Washington than any predecessor, agreed to a ten-month settlement freeze at the beginning of his premiership and again reined in settlement activity in because of American opposition.
Other prime ministers Rabin, Peres, Barak, Olmert, even Sharon hewed to policies far more closely aligned with American wishes and, in at least one case Barakgreatly exceeded them. And this, indeed, is one of the defining—if superficially puzzling—characteristics of the asymmetrical America-Israel relationship: Mostly, though, it reflects a calculation of American strategic interests. That Israel faces uniquely difficult and harsh external circumstances, and that preservation of its security can at times require unusual measures, is something long recognized by Washington.
By allowing Jerusalem a measure of freedom, especially at the low and high ends of the threat scale, the United States frees itself of that responsibility.
At least to some extent, then, instances of independent Israeli conduct should be viewed not as defiance of the United States but as indications of the maturity of the relationship. At the same time, however, it is arguably if uncomfortably true that, as a small actor facing numerous and often severe threats, but with limited influence of its own, Israel has become too reliant on the United States as the patron of first and last resort for virtually all of its problems.
Israel can and does occasionally appeal to other countries, but such appeals are usually of marginal utility, and what the United States cannot achieve, Israel almost certainly cannot achieve on its own, which reduces the incentive to try. Although the United States is indeed a generally reliable patron and does try to live up to its commitments, it has failed Israel on a number of critical occasions.
And in some of these cases Israel has been forced to take action on its own—thereby demonstrating, notwithstanding the reality of its dependence on Washington, a different strategic imperative: And if the latter, what then? Israel can thus count on American support for the medium to long term; but the degree of that support could change, and even a marginal decline would have profound effects. Several factors are worth considering in this connection.
Although overall support for Israel in the U. One of the secrets of American support for Israel has been its historically bipartisan nature. But even before the dramatic confrontation over the Iran nuclear deal, Republicans and conservatives were becoming far more supportive of Israel than liberals and Democrats. Not that there was or is anything wrong with rising support on the right; it is the loss of support on the left, and the identification of Israel as a partisan issue, that is of concern.
So it is not surprising, although surely dismaying, that a survey should have found 25 percent of American students believing Israel to be an apartheid state, with a further 50 percent undecided.
Canada - Israel Relations
These young people are unlikely to turn into future supporters of Israel, whether as voters or as holders of positions of influence. Low birth rates, high intermarriage rates, and assimilation continue to undermine the strength of the Jewish community, historically an irreplaceable source of support for Israel.
True, somewhat offsetting these trends is the change in the religious composition of the Jewish population: Proportionally, 35 percent of all American Jewish children under the age of five today are Orthodox, and by the Orthodox community as a whole may increase from 10 to 25 percent of the total Jewish population today.
Among the Orthodox and many of the ultra-Orthodox, support for Israel is firm—although, as the above percentages suggest, their absolute numbers still lag behind those of Conservative and Reform Jews. Another factor is the erosion of the centralized approach toward Israel that long characterized the organized Jewish community. In Congress, support for Israel has become a proverbial mile wide and inch deep, frequently mouthed as a kind of boilerplate that elected officials repeat without much conviction.
To these large tectonic shifts one has to add that support for Israel in Congress—which, based on voting records, has never been stronger—appears to have become a proverbial mile wide and inch deep. Staunch support for Israel plays well in a number of highly committed and influential constituencies, but elsewhere it seems to be mouthed as a kind of superficial boilerplate that elected officials have learned to repeat without much conviction.
In explaining this state of affairs, some have pointed to the Obama effect. As the product of a generation brought up and educated with a more hostile conception of Israel and with greater sympathy for the Palestinian cause, President Obama, it is said, introduced an unprecedentedly unfriendly attitude to Israel at the highest levels of the government. To the degree this assessment is true, however, the question is whether Obama was an exception or the herald of a larger emerging trend.
So far, President Trump has allayed concern by striking out in the opposite direction, but whether this will amount in the end to a partial or a permanent restoration remains to be seen. Does that mean that Israel should position itself for an era not of actively hostile presidents but of presidents who may well lack the warm instincts of recent predecessors? Strategic interests are a primary determinant of international relations; but so, too, and more often than many believe, are human emotions.
Two countries that could weather the crisis over the Iran deal, in addition to longstanding differences over the future of the West Bank, are likely to continue to enjoy a strong relationship.
- Alliance of the periphery
- After America leaves: Israel’s “new” Periphery Doctrine
- Special-Relationship Doctrine Law and Legal Definition
There are, however, highly worrisome medium-term trends, and the relationship can no longer be taken for granted as it could in recent decades. Even a small modulation in American support would be of great consequence for Israel; were current trends to continue, the change could become more than marginal. To put the question at its starkest: The question is, of course, speculative, and very hard to answer in any definitive manner.
First of all, Israel itself, as a country, clearly could survive the demise of the US. Second, however, for the defense budget, of which U. Even assuming the political willingness to do so—a highly questionable assumption—none would be willing to provide the funding; nor is there any qualitative substitute for American arms.
Israel does manufacture and export a remarkable variety of munitions on its own, but these are designed to fulfill unique operational needs. Otherwise, there are only three exceptions to its reliance on weapons systems from the U. Moreover, as we saw earlier, the U. No other country can or would provide Israel with such capabilities and assurances, and no other country would have helped Israel build a rocket and missile shield—the only one of its kind in the world—or reportedly engage with Israel in joint offensive cyber operations.
On the diplomatic level, too, there is no alternative to the United States today. No other permanent member of the Security Council would repeatedly use its veto to protect Israel from sanctions, or provide diplomatic cover in virtually all international forums, or even try to take a balanced position on the peace process.
Militarily and diplomatically, it would be close to impossible. No one likes to be reliant on a foreign power, even one as friendly and well-meaning toward Israel as the United States.
This, however, is the reality, and its implications for policy need to be faced soberly. What Is to Be Done Pulling the lens back a bit, one can safely say that, militarily, Israel has never been stronger or more secure. The Arab armies of yore are in disarray or their governments, gratifyingly, are at peace with Israel, and there is virtually no danger of conventional military-to-military warfare.
Hamas poses a painful but limited threat, Hizballah a major but not existential threat. He should be rotting in jail. That the United States is giving this band of racist war criminals billions of dollars every year is a travesty.
That the reputation of American has been besmirched worldwide because of its reflexive support of anything and everything that this rogue regime does is a national disgrace.
Gazans are demonstrating in part because they are starving. They have no clean drinking water because Israel has destroyed the purification plants as part of a deliberate policy to make life in the Strip so miserable that everyone will leave or die in place. And even leaving is problematical as Israel controls the border and will not let Palestinians enter or depart. It also controls the Mediterranean Sea access to Gaza.
Fisherman go out a short distance from the shore to bring in a meager catch. If they go any farther they are shot dead by the Israeli Navy. Such claims are bogus as Israel enjoys a monopoly of force and is never hesitant to use it.
Over in the other Palestinian enclave the West Bank, or what remains of it, the story is the same. Brutal heavily armed Israeli settlers rampage, poisoning Palestinian water, maiming and killing their livestock and even murdering local residents. Children throw stones or slap a soldier and wind up in Israeli prisons.
The settlers are backed up by the army and paramilitary police who also shoot first. The Israeli military courts, who have jurisdiction over the occupied West Bank, rarely convict a Jew when an Arab is killed or beaten.
And here in America a bought-and-paid-for Congress continues to do its bit. Last week President Trump signed the so-called Taylor Force Act, part of the marathon spending bill, which will cut aid going to the Palestinian Authority while also increasing the money going to Israel.
Back in January, Congress had also cut the funding going to support Palestinians who are still living in U. During the perfunctory debate on the measure, Congressmen were lied to by pro-Israel lobbyists who claimed that Arabs are terrorism supporters and use the money to attack Israelis. I could go on and on, but the message should be clear to every American.
There is no net gain for the United States in continuing the lopsided and essentially immoral relationship with the self-styled Jewish State.
There is no enhancement of American national security, quite the contrary, and there remains only the sad realization that the blood of many innocent people is, to a considerable extent, on our hands.